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Abstract

Human life occurs within a complex bio-psycho-social milieu, a heterogeneous system that is
integrated by multiple bidirectional interrelations existing between the abstract-intangible ideas
and physical-chemical support of environment. The mind is thus placed between the abstract
ideas/ concepts and neurobiological brain that is further connected to environment. In other
words, the mind acts as an interface between the immaterial (abstract/ intangible) data and
material (biological) support. The science is unable to conceives and explains an interaction
between the immaterial and material domains (to understand nature of the mind), this question
generating in literature the mind-body problem.
We have published in the past a succession of articles related to the mind-body problem, in
order to demonstrate the fact that this question is actually a false issue. The phenomenon of
immaterial-material interaction is impossible to be explained because it never occurs, which
means that there is no need to explain the immaterial-material interaction. Our mind implies only
a temporal association between the immaterial data and material support, this dynamic
interrelation being presented and argued here as a solution to the mind-body problem.
The limited psycho-biologic approach of the mind-body problem is expanded here to a more
comprehensive and feasible bio-psycho-social perspective, generating thus three distinct (biopsychological, bio-social, and psycho-social) equations. These three equations can be solved
through a solution represented by a dynamic cerebral system (two distinct and interconnected
subunits of the brain) which presumably could have the capability of receiving and processing
abstract data through association (with no interaction) between immaterial and material data.
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Highlights

✓

Interaction between immaterial data and material brain is not possible, the mind body
problem referring rather to procession of immaterial data by our material brain.

✓

Procession of abstract data by our brain is possible through association between
immaterial data and material/nervous impulses of the brain, interface of this association
being represented by time
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Introduction
The mind governs to a great extent both one’s
physical existence and psycho-social life, having a
psychological self/ identity that is distinct from the
physical body, and a conscious reality (colors, sounds,
etc.) that differs from the surrounding physical and
chemical external reality (electromagnetic waves, air
vibration, chemical compounds, etc.) (1, 2).
Beyond the individual psychological existence, a
society is based on the persistent social participation and
interaction of its individual members, thus affords to its
members benefits that would not otherwise be possible.
Such benefits can be in the form of individual and/ or
common benefits, and refer to various (abstract or
concrete) kinds of advantages that result from social
exchanges (e.g., learning, cultural traditions, playing
games like chess, etc.). A society is thus characterized
by patterns of relationships (in the form of social
relations) between individuals who share a distinctive
culture and personality. Accordingly, a given society
can be described as the sum of the existing relationships
of its constituent members. A large society may exhibit
stratification or dominance patterns among subgroups,
which usually become evident during mental
interactions among its members (3, 4).
Thus, the individual is part of the society, governed
by its norms and values, but who at the same time must
integrate within the larger prevailing social system. If
the individual contributes to societal goals, that society
in turn contributes to the individual’s mental
development. In support of this idea, social medium, for
example, is critical for evolution and development of the
mind, either through a positive involvement in education
and learning or, alternatively, by limiting/
counterproductive factors (social restrictions, social
competition and exclusion, irrational mentalities, etc.).
Human beings are therefore complex bio-psychosocial entities that represent the end-product of
interactions among biological (genetic, neural,
biochemical, etc), psychological (personality, mood,
behaviour,
etc.)
and
sociocultural
(school,
socioeconomic tasks, cultural medium, religious norms/
beliefs, etc.) factors (5).
Contrary to this integrated bio-psycho-social
perspective, literature data is still dissociated by
restricted interpretations and results. For example, the
psychological identity is presented in a didactic way in
relation with self-image (the view you have of yourself),
self-esteem (how much value you place on yourself),
and individuality. It is unclear to what extent the selfcomponents would be supported by the brain, or they

would be in fact just analytical interpretation/ products
of the mind (6). At opposite end, mental impairments
like autism or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
would result (according to imagistic studies) due to
functional disruption of several brain networks (7-9).
As a consequence, it would be insufficient to study
mental entities and events from restricted (either
psychological or biological) perspectives. For this
reason, there are papers presenting new psychophysiologic approaches, with psychological phenomena
(such as internal mental interaction) resulting from
cerebral interaction between distinct subunits of the
brain. In this paper, we elaborate upon this concept of
internal mental interaction from a unified bio-psychosocial perspective for humans, a conceptualization
which might further represent a solution to the mindbody problem.

Discussion
From a physiologic perspective, environmental
interaction (between external stimuli and the body) ends
at the level of primary somatosensory cortex. According
to indirect realism, data from primary somatosensory
cortex is further projected within the brain (to secondary
somatosensory cortex) creating a veritable internalmental copy of the environment (10). Recent papers
sustain that concepts like indirect realism, the self and
identity should be revised, not only in respect to the level
of organization and deployment (psychological versus
bio-phycho-social), but also regarding the role and
interrelations of the respective entities and events (11).
Thus, a relatively new theory sustains that the mind
would be comprised of two distinct and complementary
subunits of the brain, represented by “internal mental
existence” and “internal mental reality”, interacting with
one another in the form of “internal mental interaction”
(Figure 1). As a consequence, entire environmental
interaction would be actually projected and reproduced
within the brain, environmental stimuli being projected
as internal mental reality (supported by the somatic
nervous system) while the body would be projected as
internal mental existence (supported by autonomic
nervous system). Accordingly, internal mental existence
and internal mental reality would be supported by
specific/ dedicated neurological structures of the brain,
which transmit mental data from one to the other (12).
From a functional point of view, the deployment of
internal mental interaction would be independently by
environmental interaction, these two/ parallel
interactions being interconnected just informationally.
This functional disconnection would be able to explain
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the autonomy of the mind in respect to environment
(focusing attention on internal ideas/ representations
while ignoring external stimuli, dreams, imagination,
etc.), the fact that the mind works with internal stimuli
and elaborates internal responses (without a mandatory
externalization), and some pathological situations like
autism spectrum disorder.
Corresponding to the physical body, internal mental
existence possesses on one hand the attentional focus to
receive afferents (inputs), and on the other the decisionmaking process to elaborate responses (to release
outputs). The appurtenance of decision making
processes and attentional focus to the same neuroinformational entity of the brain (internal mental
existence) is able to explain the close connection
existing between these two processes. Sometimes our
decisions originate from our attentional focus, while
other times we first decide what to do and subsequently
direct our attentional focus towards objects/ people that
support the performing of the established target/ desire.
But, in handling abstract data, our autonomic system
supporting internal mental existence is not able to
interact with classical neurophysiological processes of

the brain. As a consequence, both attentional focus and
decision-making processes imply intervention of a
specific interface (internal mental reality), to ensure
conversion of information between the mental (abstract)
format and the neurophysiologic format (of the body),
conversion that represents the core subject of the mindbody problem (11).
Literature conceptualization on this topic focuses
on two distinct notions: indirect realism and the
psychology of self. Indirect realism is viewed as an
internal projection of external data (10), while
psychology of self discusses about the self as “I” (the
subjective knower) and also the self as “Me” (the object
that is known) (13). According to our interpretation, the
old concept of internal mental representation should be
extended to a larger approach like internal mental
reality, because it is dual performing not only inputs but
also outputs. The old concept of self should be also
revised, the self as “I” corresponding to a real
neurologic-informational existence (internal mental
existence), while the self as “Me” would correspond to
circulating mental data that is related to our own
conscious representation (mental identity).

1. Psychological existence and the corresponding
cerebral support; internal mental existence
Although the mind incorporates an abstract
dimension, it has good connection and control over the
physical body. Thus, the mind is able to focus attention
on external physical stimuli (facilitating their entry to
the conscious domain through peripheral receptors) or
can elaborate (through conscious and voluntary decision
making) and transmit to the brain/ skeletal muscles
unlimited abstract motor responses. Such abstract
efferents are represented by gestures, motor
participation of the hands to support abstract verbal
explanations (e.g., arranging in virtual-imaginative

space abstract entities, like a company and interrelated
profit and loss), dances in different styles, and so
on (1, 14, 15).
In turn, the human body sustains the mind directly
through cerebral activation and response and indirectly
through supporting physiological (metabolic, endocrine,
respiratory, circulatory) mechanisms. As an example,
mental existence ceases when the neurophysiological
processing of the brain is interrupted through procedures
such as hypnosis or general anesthesia, and when the
brain is damaged or the physical body dies (16, 17).
Moreover, intensive abstract exercises can tire the mind,
with increased need for sleep after a period of intense
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mental concentration/ activity (18). Yet, studies using
fMRI have shown a direct connection between some
psychological performances (attention, concentration,
analytical analyze, etc.) and specific cerebral areas.
Several drugs acting within the brain keep us awake
(caffeine), and/ or improve our attentional focus
(atomoxetine) and mental power (19, 20).
Even if there is a close connection between the mind
and physical body, the mind implies a specific
(intrinsic/autonomic) presence, which was described not
only during attention-demanding tasks but also when an
individual is awake and at rest (wakeful rest). Attentiondemanding tasks seem to be supported by task positive
network of the brain, while mental presence during
wakeful rest appears to be sustained by default mode
network of the brain (7, 8). The psychological presence
(as psychological event) and the corresponding
neurological support generate together internal mental
existence, which is different by the physical existence of
the body so that it can be compatible with analytical
attention and decisions (Figure 2).
In support of internal mental existence, our mind is

1.

able for example to disconnect from environmental/
social data (ignoring external physical stimuli) and focus
attention on internal abstract ideas, impressions and
cogitations (using memory, imagination, thinking, etc.)
(1). Due to this autonomous and analytical functioning,
long-term abstract preoccupations (improvement of
one’s reputation, developmental professional strategies,
etc.) are sometimes more important for decision making
process than the short-term concrete needs of the
physiological body (eating, sleeping, etc.). Such
developmental strategies/ desires (generally abstract in
nature) are often hidden within our minds from other
members of society (who can oppose them, due to a real
competition on food, houses, jobs, privileges, etc.),
having thus a strong personal character (21, 22).
As a conclusion, the mind implies a well delineated
psychological existence, which are supported by the
brain but functionally disconnected (at least in part)
from the physiological-environmental existence. In
psychological and biological terms, the first (psychobiologic) equation of the mind-body problem is as below
(see Figure 1):

Mental Entity + Body = Individual / personalized Mental Existence

2. Conscious representation of social data in the form experiences like attitude, persuasion, social/ political
influences, social cognition, etc. From a physiological
of mental reality
perspective, the environment represents an external
The mind occupies a position “over” the individual
medium for the biological body; from the perspective of
(physical and psychological) existence, due to the fact
social psychology, the surrounding social medium is an
that it is able to establish connections not only with the
intrinsic part of our mind, in the form of mental (psychophysical body but also with abstract-intangible data
social) reality (26).
(playing chess for example, abstract conversations to
This mental (psycho-social) reality is placed to
math lessons, etc). For this reason conscious
disposition/
discretion of our mind for cognition, which
representations extend beyond the individual existence,
is
able
to
voluntarily
scan the entire conscious reality
preoccupations like learning, exploration and
documentation implying a strong social-relational (abstract job tasks, the arrangement of environmental
participation (23). The exchange of abstract ideas objects, the requests of social partners, etc.) through
between individuals (e.g., through verbal and written one’s attentional focus, selecting through decision
communication) is an essential process for acquiring making processes a certain element or task to be studied/
knowledge and for subsequent cognition (24). performed while ignoring the others. In this way,
Accordingly, mental reality overlaps to a great extent abstract social tasks sometimes take higher precedence
with the surrounding social-relational medium, a in the mind than specific individual needs and pleasures
proposition that can explain not only the extension of the (27). Mental reality/ representation incorporates
mental reality beyond the physical body, but also the
therefore not only individual mental elements
mind’s capacity for awareness of social events and data
(perceptions, feelings, beliefs, identity, etc.) but also a
(Figure 2).
dimension
(often
abstract/
Based on such mental interactions among social-relational
informational
in
nature),
being
entirely
realized
and
individuals, social psychology studies the influences
exercised by some individuals on the thoughts, feelings, processed by our mind. In psychological and social
and behaviors of others (25). Such interpersonal terms, the second (psycho-social) equation of the mindinfluences induce specific mental phenomena and body problem would be as below (see Figure 2):
2.

Mental Identity + Abstract Social Data = Psycho-Social Reality
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3. Bio-social transmission of abstract social data
Social interaction within social systems implies
usually two (or more) individuals exchanging abstract
and concrete data between them. Thus, two separate
individuals are able to transmit abstract ideas between
them, resorting usually to language to communicate (28,
29). On one hand, environmental social data are
abstract-immaterial, so that such data are unable to
interact with the physical-material body and brain. On
the other hand, transmission of abstract data between
two individuals clearly occurs, being possible through
somatic peripheral effectors (mouth) and receptors
(ears) of the body. Such transmission of abstractimmaterial data between two physical bodies is possible
through the annexation of abstract data to external
physical stimuli, the latter being able to interact with
physical receptors of the body (1, 30).
Thus, abstract data is transmitted between two
distinct persons (physical bodies) via a physical
environmental stimulus, which is capable of encoding
an abstract message. For example, a sound is a physical
stimulus (received by ears) which can encode (in the
form of a word) an abstract message (`come`). Light is
another physical stimulus (received by eyes) that can
encode (in the form of Morse code) the same abstract
message (`come`). Signs, gestures, and written language
are also received by eyes as visual stimuli, yet all these
stimuli can encode the same abstract message (`come`).

These examples indicate that an abstract/ immaterial
message can be attached to a physical stimulus, yet are
separate from the material properties of the respective
physical stimulus (you can say `come` aloud, or slowly,
or with certain tonal qualities: inviting vs demanding)
(31, 32).
As a conclusion, abstract social data are immaterial
messages that are never self-standing, so that it must be
attached to external physical stimuli. Three distinct
remarks are warranted here.
The first observation is that the described
attachment of abstract data to material stimuli makes
sense only when it is transmitted between two distinct
entities (because it incorporates a message), and when
the two entities use the same encoding-decoding
procedure/ language (the receiver person must be able to
extract the abstract message carried by the physical
stimulus. As an example, while one person might
understand the meaning of a certain word in his/her
native language, another who does not know that
language would not understand the message (the word
has no significance) (12, 22).
The second is that the attachment of abstract data to
a physical stimulus is a dynamic association, established
between an abstract message and succession in time of
several physical stimuli (light signals for Morse code,
letters in words, etc.). This dynamic association is
therefore possible through time, which is related to both
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physical matter (being physically measurable) and to
abstract data (which is non-material) (1). Abstract
immaterial data can therefore be associated in dynamics
(in time) with several successive physical stimuli, but
with no direct connection or interaction with the
physical stimuli because abstract immaterial data and
physical stimuli are distinct in nature.
The third remark is that abstract-immaterial data are
associated in time with physical stimuli, so that abstractimmaterial data and properties of physical stimuli

(as material data) can be associated/ interrelated (which
does not mean they interact), generating together
through emergentism a new entity, in the form of
immaterial-material data.
Immaterial-material information should, therefore,
be able to exhibit new properties, which would have no
meaning in a limited bio-social approach, because these
new properties should emerge over/ above the level of
material-immaterial organization and interpretation (1)
(Figure 3).

As an example, in a psychological interpretation,
when intensity of the sound adds to an abstract message,
the resulted material-immaterial information exhibits
mental properties which can be received by a person/
mind in the form of emotional messages like anger (e.g.,
when saying `go` screaming), endearing/ affectionate
(when saying `come` whispering/ delicate), etc (33).
Being compatible with our mind, the materialimmaterial information (supported by physical stimuli)

is therefore mental in nature. In turn, the mind should
present a similar organization, consisting of a physical
support (the brain) and the corresponding materialimmaterial information, a supra-physiologic system that
emerges over the level of material-immaterial
representation and interpretation (1, 34).
In biological and abstract-social terms, the third
(bio-social) equation of the mind-body problem would
be:

3.

Physical stimuli + Abstract-Social Data = Social interaction = Transfer of abstract data between two
physical bodies/ entities

4. A bio-psycho-social integration
The three perspectives presented above (psychobiologic, psycho-social and bio-social) must merge into
a unitary bio-psycho-social model, with such a unified
model being specific for humans (35). In support of this,
we are for example conscious about psycho-social
reality not only during interaction with social medium
(as a result of social activity), but also at the individual
level (as a result of cerebral activity). Thus, the
conscious social reality can be contemplated/ studied by

an individual through imagination, memory, or
dreaming (36, 37).
To arrive at this unitary model, it is necessary to
transfer and implement inside of a single brain the
psycho-social reality, due to three important reasons: a)
we are aware of the psycho-social reality, b) conscious
reality has a strong individual appurtenance, and c)
social cognition/ abstract events are strongly related to
specific cerebral areas of the brain (3, 12, 24, 26, 27, 30).
In this way it is actually generated a personal/individual
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and supra-physiologic (material-immaterial) mental
reality, closely related to the individual mental state
described by commonsense psychology. Being
individualized, a person can resort to his/her own mental
state and experience to explain and predict the behaviors
and mental states of other people in a wide range of
circumstances. Being supra-physiologic, the mental
state is able to explain specific mental processes (like
pain, pleasure, excitement, anxiety, envy, pride,
empathy, etc) and, in addition, to interact with abstract/
mental data (38, 39).
The most feasible way to transfer/ create a
conscious social reality within a single brain is to copy

the entire social model within the respective brain.
According to the social model, abstract social reality is
an incontestable event and results from two distinct
persons exchanging abstract messages between them. In
a similar way, two distinct neuronal subunits of a brain
(internal mental reality and existence) should be capable
of exchanging abstract messages (or, more precisely,
material-immaterial information) between them,
creating/ supporting within the respective brain a supraphysiologic internal mental interaction (1, 40).
This assumption of a “dual” brain can be verified
resorting to the three equations of the mind-body
problem.

Mind =

Individual Mental Existence

+

Psycho-Social Reality

Mind =

Mental Entity + Body

+

Mental Identity + Abstract Social Data

Mind =

Mental Entity + Mental Identity

+

Physical support + Abstract Social Data

Mind =

Conscious Existence and Representation

+

Transfer of abstract data between two
physical entities (subunits of the brain)

within
a
supra-physiologic
From a physiological perspective, the two distinct 5. Consciousness
interpretation
neuronal subunits of the brain could be represented by
When the mind processes any kind of (abstract or
somatic and autonomic nervous sub-systems. The
concrete) data, the physiological mechanisms
somatic nervous system (SNS) ensures the relational
supporting procession are the same, but the responses
connection of the body with the external medium (a
are different according to the type of information that is
physical/ chemical reality: electromagnetic waves, processed. The mind is therefore able to access and
acids, bases, etc.), which is projected within the brain as process distinct information in distinct sessions
an internal mental reality (colours, tastes, smells, etc.). (mathematics, cultural, related to its own self, etc.),
The autonomic nervous system (ANS) would support somewhat similar to a computer that can run (on the
the mental entity, which analytically processes mental same hardware support) distinct software applications in
data received (through attentional focus) from the distinct sessions (as seen in computational
neurosciences). Such mental processing can be
internal mental reality.
The involvement of the ANS in the construction of performed individually, or in the form of social
the mind could explain the mind’s capacity to work with communication and learning (43, 44).
The SNS ensures the relational connection of the
internal stimuli instead of external stimuli (e.g., colours,
body with external medium and internal mental reality,
sounds exist only in our mind), to elaborate internal
while the ANS supports mental entity/decision and
responses (with no mandatory external transmission),
attentional focus. But the mental data are dynamic
and
to
support
environmentally-independent
(material-immaterial data must be circulated biautonomous functioning (imagination, dreams, etc.)
directionally), and the mind has a consciousness. To
(40-42). This autonomous functioning could explain an explain these characteristics, it has been suggested that
individual’s mental capacity to disconnect attention the ANS receives nervous impulses from the SNS,
from environmental/ social data (ignoring external ensures processing of the information received/
physical stimuli) in favor of internal abstract ideas/ associated in an analytical manner, and the results are
impressions (cogitation).
sent back towards the SNS. The process described
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continues indefinitely (with the same or other data), Conclusions
resulting in a bidirectional and continuous circuit for
The mind-body problem refers to the existing
mental data, which must flow/ be dynamic (1, 45, 46)
interrelation between the abstract mind and the material
(Figure 1).
body. This paper continues a series of articles on this
In psychological terms, our mental presence is able
to select and receive (through voluntary attentional topic, suggesting that the physical matter (body and
focus) data from the internal mental reality, to consider brain) is not able to interact with abstract data, but can
it in an analytical manner, and return the outcome however receive and process such abstract data.
(involuntarily) back to the internal mental reality. This Transmission of abstract data to a person is possible
circuit resumes so that the individual is notified through through association between immaterial and material
attentional focus about the action (decision making data, an association that is performed in time and as a
process), about a specific object (that was taken into dynamic attachment (1). Even an ordinary word for
consideration), or about our mental entity (as a subject example encodes abstract data through several letters/
of our attention). This is the consciousness (qualia)—the sounds produced over time.
state/ quality that enables the “somebody” (ANS) to be
aware (informed) of the “something” (SNS)—within a
continuous feed-back loop that keeps us conscious and
awake (1). Even if the circulating data are similar along
the two directions, only the direction from internal
mental reality/ something (the SNS) towards mental
identity (ANS) represents consciousness, as attentional

The abstract dimension of the mind is a dynamic
process within the brain even during sleep, and thus is
able to explain the occurrence of dreams. When this
dynamic process is terminated (for example, a cerebral
hypoxia, for only 4-8 minutes), the abstract dimension
of the mind ceases permanently. In such a case the brain

focus. The opposite direction does not engender may still be able to produce an arousal state, but one
consciousness, due to the fact that the “something” can’t without awareness (consciousness and mental identity
are permanently lost, or severe impaired), a condition

be aware about the “somebody” (1, 22).

The mind has thus a conscious domain and an described in the literature as persistent vegetative state
unconscious part. Physiologically, for example, the (47).
body is unable to ingest external visual stimuli, because

Finally, the mind is not a simple neuro-

external stimuli belong to the environment. An informational entity. Rather, it is a system composed of
electromagnetic field (the physical format of external two distinct and interconnected neuro-informational
visual stimulus), for example, terminates at the level/ entities, using the same language for encoding-decoding
contact with cone cells of the eye. From this point data. The consequence of data transfer (between SNS
forward, the qualitative and quantitative properties of and ANS) is not a summing effect of the two neurothe external visual stimulus are transformed in a informational entities, because these two structures
physiologic format (nervous impulse) and transmitted to (having distinct/ complementary roles) present actually
the primary somatosensory cortex. Thus, the primary synergistic actions (and have no sense if one is isolated/
somatosensory cortex has no access to the external studied separately from the other) (1). While some
(physical/

chemical)

format

of

environmental cerebral structures support internal mental reality

information (45). In a similar way, our mind has no (colors for example), other structures are involved in
access to the physiologic format of information, because experiential sense of self (continuity of 'I' experience),
the mind is organized above this level of representation. according to imagistic studies (21, 47, 48). Accordingly,
In other words, attentional focus is unable to identify the the SNS and ANS together create through emergentism
neurological support of the surrounding internal mental a complex neuro-informational entity which is able to
reality (our mental existence is unable to be conscious support a dynamic processing and representation of
about neurological component of the mind), because the mental substance (as immaterial-material nature) of the
mind and consciousness emerges at a supra-physiologic mind (1, 40). New studies will be necessary to further
level. It is a consequence of the fact that internal mental develop the concept of immaterial-material association,
existence is designed to only receive specific data (in a as previously described through fMRI studies (for
mental format) from internal mental reality (1, 46).

example, for visuo-haptic convergence) (49, 50), or to
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explain multiple interrelations existing between the
mind, autonomic nervous system and sexuality (51-53).
10.
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